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Comments
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS T6 DECIDE QUESTIONS ARISING OUT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Prior to the National Labor Relations Act " individual rights under collective
bargaining agreements were enforced by courts.2 Since enactment of that statute
1. 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § § 151-166 (1940).
2. See Hamilton, Individual Rights Arising from Collective Labor Con-
tracts, (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 252.
1
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there has been some doubt as to whether or not jurisdiction over all questions
arising under collective bargaining contracts made pursuant to rights established by
that Act had been vested'in the National Labor Relations Board to the exclusion
of the courts.
JURISDICTION IN AcTrios TO ENFORCE RIGHT CREATED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELAEIONS Acr
What is the nature of the rights vested in the National Labor Relations Board
by the National Labor Relations Act? No private rights are vested in the board
and the procedure which the Act authorizes the board to employ is for the
adjudication of public, not private, rights. In National Licorice Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board3 the board brought a proceeding to enforce an order which
it had entered pursuant to its findings that the Licorice company was guilty of
unfair labor practices and that contracts made by the company with its em-
ployees were made in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The court
below enforced the order and the company brought the case to the Supreme
Court on certiorari, claiming, among other things, that the board had no authority
to make any order with respect to the contracts because the individual employees
were not parties to the proceeding. The board's order was held valid, the Court
saying:
"The proceeding authorized to be taken by the Board under the
National Labor Relations Act is not for the adjudication of private rights.
No. 342, Amalgamated Utility Workers, U.W.O.C. v. Consolidated Edison
Co. decided this term, [309 U.S. 261, ante, 738, 60 S. Ct. 561], H. Rept.
No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Committee on Labor, p. 24; cf. Federal
Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 74 L. Ed. 138, 50 S. Ct. 1,
68 A.L.R. 838. It has few of the indicia of a priviate litigation and makes
no requirement for the presence in it of any private party other than the
employer charged with an unfair labor practice. The Board acts in a
public capacity to give effect to the declared public policy of the Act
to eliminate and prevent obstructions to interstate commerce by en-
couraging collective bargaining and by protecting the 'exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment.'. .. § 1. The immediate object of the
proceeding is to prevent unfair labor practices which, as defined by §§
7, 8, are practices tending to thwart the declared policy of the Act. To
that end the Board is authorized to order the employer to desist from
such practices, and by § 10 (c) it is given authority to take such affirma-
tive remedial action as will effectuate the policies of the Act. National
Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound. ...
"In a proceeding so narrowly restricted to the protection and en-
forcement of public rights, there is little scope or need for the traditional
rules governing the joinder of parties in litigation determining private
rights ....
"As the National Labor Relations Act contemplates no more than
3. 309 U.S. 350, 362, 366, 60 Sup. Ct. 569 (1940).
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the protection of the public rights which it creates and defines, and as the
Board's order is directed solely to the employer and is ineffective to deter-
mine any private rights of the employees and leaves them free to assert
such legal rights as they may have acquired under their contracts, in any
appropriate tribunal, we think they are not indispensable parties for
purposes of the Board's order and the statute does not require their
presence as parties to the present proceeding and there was no abuse of
the Board's discretion in its failure to make them parties."
To the same effect is A'malgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York,4 where it was held that a labor union could not maintain a
proceeding to have the Edison company adjudged in contempt for failure to
comply with parts of a decree entered by the circuit court of appeals enforcing
an order of the National Labor Relations Board. The Court held that no private
rights were created by the National Labor Relations Act and that the board was
the proper party to institute contempt proceedings.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,5 the
employer, the Ledger company, after bargaining collectively with the Newark
Newspaper Guild, a labor union, entered into a contract with the Guild acting for
the employees. The contract, among other things, provided that the Ledger com-
pany would not discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because
of membership or activity in the Guild. Fahy, president of the Guild, later was
discharged. A complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Board. After
a hearing the board ordered the Ledger company to cease and desist from discour-
aging membership in the Guild and to reinstate Fahy. This is a proceeding in the
circuit court of appeals to enforce that order. Evidently (although the report of
the case does not specifically so state )the employer contended the board had no
jurisdiction for the reason that the facts constituted merely a breach of the
agreement between the Ledger company and the Guild and that, therefore, the
jurisdiction was in the courts, rather than the board. Originally the court held
that the Board had no jurisdiction. On rehearing, however, it changed its views
and held that jurisdiction was in the board. The court said:
"We are thus not called upon to determine whether Miss Fahy has
an individual right to secure redress for her wrongful discharge or whether
the law of New Jersey affords her a forum for the appropriate redress of
her grievance. The existence of such a private right in Miss Fahy in no
way affects the public right or the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to
enforce it. This is clear from the express provision of Section 10(a), 29
U.S.C.A. § 160(a), that the power of the Board to prevent unfair labor
practices 'shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, code, law, or otherwise.' A misconception of the nature of
the Board's process may arise from the fact that in the enforcement of
the public right to have the channels of interstate commerce freed from
obstructions resulting from unfair labor practices a private right of an
4. 309 U.S. 261, 60 Sup. Ct. 561 (1940).
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employee may incidentally be protected or enforced. Even though private
relief is thus afforded it nevertheless remains true that the Board's powers
may be invoked only when there is a public right to be protected and that
its processes are never available to a private suitor.
"It is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Board to prevent unfair
labor practices is very broad. It is, we think, equally clear that the
exercise of this jurisdiction in any particular case, is ,under the language
of Section 10, discretionary with the Board. The jurisdiction is not to be
exercised unless in the opinion of the Board the unfair labor practice
complained of interferes so substantially with the public rights created
by Section 7 as to require its restraint in the public interest. As we have
seen ,the mere fact that a private right of an employee has been infringed,
by the act of an employer is not of itself sufficient to bring the Board's
powers into play. The Congress, has, however, reposed in the Board com-
plete discretionary power to determine in each case whether the public
interest requires it to act. With appropriate exercise of that discretion
we may not interfere." (Italics added.)
It appears, therefore, that the rights or powers vested in the board are public
rights to be exercised only where the public interest or welfare is concerned-
that public interest as set forth in the National Labor Relations Act; and that
the board's powers are to be exercised to protect the interest which the public
has in the right of employees as individuals to organize and bargain collectively
and to safeguard that right from any infringement by employers through actions
declared by the Act to be unfair labor practices. It should follow, therefore, that
jurisdiction over all other questions of a justiciable nature arising out of labor
agreement resulting from collective bargaining is in the courts.
In the fact that the National Labor Relations Board 'is vested with public
rights only and empowered to protect and enforce such rights to the exclusion of
private rights, it is somewhat similar to the Federal Trade Commission. In
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, the Court, in
its opinion, cited Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner,6 in which it was held that
an action brought by the trade commission to enforce an order which it had
entered against Klesner should have been dismissed because the proceeding, as
originally instituted by and before the commission, was not in the public interest.
It is true, of course, that the Federal Trade Commission Act7 contains an express
provision that a complaint may be filed by the commission only "if it shall appear
to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the
interest of the public," and that no such provision is incorporated in the National
Labor Relations Act. But the decision in the National Licorice Co. case, supra,
is essentially the converse of that in Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, supra.
That is to say, in the Licorice case the private rights of the employees under
contracts made with the employer were not affected by the proceeding before or
the order of the board because the proceeding was one in the public interest and,
6. 280 U.S. 19, 50 Sup. Ct. 1 (1929).
7. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1940).
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as the Court said, "the Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body,
charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices."
So far no case has been dismissed by a court for the reason that a proceeding
before the National Labor Relations Board was not in the public interest. The
closest approach to that question was reached in Amalgamated Utility Workers v.
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., 'supra, in which the Court held that a private
party could not assert public rights the enforcement of which was left, by the
Act, exclusively to the board.
If the language found in National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., supra, is a safe criterion, it is unlikely that it will be held that a
proceeding before the board was not in the public interest provided the board
has made an affirmative finding on that question. Note the language used by the
court: "The Congress, has, however, reposed in the Board complete discrelonary
power to determine in each case whether the public interest requires it to act.
With appropriate exercise of that discretion we may not interfere.",, A discussion
of what is "appropriate exercise of that discretion" will not be here attempted.
By way of contrast and illustration of the different congressional intent in
the enactment of the two statutes, there are no provisions in the National Labor
Relations Act comparable to those of the Railway Labor Act'0 found in Section
3(i) thereof." As stated in that section, jurisdiction is given to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board to hear "disputes between an employee or group
of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions," . . . And Section 5 Second12 authorizes either party to an
agreement reached through mediation as provided for by the Act, in case a
controversy arises over the meaning or application of the agreement, to apply
to the National Mediation Board for an interpretation of the meaning or appli-
cation of such agreement and authorizes the board, after hearing, to give its
interpretation of such agreement.
If Congress, therefore, had desired to provide the National Labor Relations
Board with comparable jurisdiction, there existed precedent therefor, as the
Railway Labor Act was first enacted in 1926 and put, for the most part, in its
present form in 1934. The National Labor Relations Act was not enacted until 1935.
Notwithstanding the later decisions in which the Supreme Court, by dicta
at least, clearly indicated that the private rights of the parties to collective
bargaining agreements remained subject to adjudication by appropriate courts, one
of the first such cases to come before a federal district court caused it no little
trouble. In M and M Wood Working Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local Union
8. 309 U.S. 350, 364, 60 Sup. Ct. 569, 577 (1940).
9. 120 F. (2d) 262, 268, 269 (C.C.A. 3d, 1941).
10. 45 U.S.C." §§ 151-188 (1940).
11. 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1940).
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No. 102,13 the plaintiff employer had entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with a labor union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and had
agreed to employ only members of such union. Thereafter, a majority of the mem-
bers of the union withdrew from the organization and organized a new union which
became affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The Congress of
Industrial Organizations union then claimed the rights under the labor agreement
made by the employer with the American Federation of Labor union and, upon
the employer's attempts to operate its plant with American Federation of Labor
men, resirted to violence to prevent such action. The employer then brought an
action to enjoin the violence and picketing by the Congress of Industrial Orgahi-
zations union, claiming that under its contract it could employ only American
Federation of Labor workers. The question of the employer's rights and obligations
under the agreement was thus indirectly presented to the court even though it
is not clear, from the report of the case, whether the other contracting party
(American Federation of Labor union) was a party to the suit. The case is com-
plicated by considerations of the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 14 but
the court held that Act inapplicable. It was not at all sure, however, whether it
or the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction of the controversy, saying:
"The court is not grasping of jurisdiction. If the National Labor
Relations Board has the power to act, this court will not interfere with or
hamper its action no matter how long delayed. The Congress of the
United States has written the laws and the court will meticulously follow
the limitations."15
In an earlier case' 6 based on a conspiracy to prevent the operation of
plaintiff's factory and destroy its business, rather than on the fact of a c6llective
bargaining contract between plaintiff and its employees, the court found its
jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order in the terms of the National
Labor Relations Act itself.
JURISDIcTION OF FEDERAL COURTS TO ENFORCE RIGHTS NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT
But even though the National Labor Relations Act is a federal enactment
and creates certain rights in employees, such fact does not confer on federal courts
jurisdiction to enforce those rights as arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, absent action by the National Labor Relations Board to determine
what the rights are. In Blankenship v. Kurfma,'17 Blankenship and others, who
were the plaintiffs, were members of Local 702 of International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers. Kurfman and others, defendants, were members of Local 165
13. 23 F. Supp. 11 (D. Ore. 1938).
14. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1940).
15. 23 F. Supp. 11, 19 (D. Ore. 1938).
16. Oberman & Co., Inc., v. United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp.
20 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
17. 96 F. (2d) 450, 453, 454 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938).
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of International Hod Carriers Building & Common Laborers Union. Both were
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The plaintiffs were all employed
in the gas department of the Central Illinois Light Company and all the employees
of this department were members of Local 702. The company made a contract
with Local 702. Subsequently, the defendants and other members of Local 165
demanded that praintiffs stop work and threatened them with physical vio-
lence in an attempt to compel plaintiffs to join Local 165 and to compel
the company to make a contract with the latter. Plaintiffs brought this
suit to enjoin defendants individually and as members of Local 165 from in-
terfering with, threatening or exercising violence against plaintiffs while in the
course of their employment. Plaintiffs contended that the court had jurisdiction
because defendants' acts deprived them of rights and privileges secured to them
by the National Labor Relations Act. But the court thought otherwise, saying:
"The proposition of the plaintiffs that the effect of National Labor
Relations Act, especially sections 157 and 159(a) of title 29 U.S.C.A.,
is to create a federal right, the violation of which by the defendants
entitles plaintiffs to injunctive relief, is untenable.
"The general purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to
provide methods of preventing or eliminating certain 'unfair practices'
which have heretofore characterized the relation of employer and employee,
and which have obstructed, or tended to obstruct, the free flow of com-
merce. The act creates certain rights and duties as between employer
and employee and provides the procedure necessary to give effect thereto.
It seems clear that th)e only rights which are made enforceable by the
act are those which have been determined by the National Labor Relations
Board to exist -under the facts of each case; and when these rights have
been determined, the method of enforcing them which is provided by the
Act itself must be followed. And we find no provision in the act which can
be construed as intending to create rights for employees which can be
enforced in federal courts independently of action by the National Labor
Relations Board. Consequently, we hold that the contract in the instant
case between the plaintiffs and their employer did not, by force of the
National Labor Relations Act, create a right in the plaintiffs which was
secured to them 'by the Constitution or laws of the United States.'
Consequently, the alleged unlawful interference by the defendants with
the plaintiffs' contractual rights did not give a cause of action of which
a federal court would have jurisdiction in the absence of diversity of
citizenship." (Italics added.)
If the Act conferred no rights on employees enforceable in federal courts in
the absence of action by the board, it is not surprising to find a federal court
holding the same to be true of employers. In Lund v. Woodenware Workers
Union,18 a majority of the employer Lund's employees had elected representatives
for collective bargaining and he had made an agreement with' them covering
terms and conditions of employment. A minority had gone on strike and were, by
acts of violence and intimidation, preventing the majority from working. Lund
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sued to enjoin the minority from interfering with the contract he had made with the
majority, contending that under Section 159(a), Title 29 U.S.C.A. (the National
Labor Relations Act) he was required to deal only with representatives of the
majority and that he had no adequate remedy at law because, under the National
Labor Relations Act, no provision was made for employers to petition the labor
board. The court denied the injunction, saying:
"Unquestionably, the contract that plaintiff contends he has entered
into with the representatives of the majority of his employees may be
entirely valid, but the mere fact that the employer has made a valid
contract with his employees does not, of itself, give rise to any justiciable
controversy in federal court under the act. There is no intimation in the
act that, merely because an employer has entered into a contract with a
majority union, Congress assumed to vest jurisdiction in United States
courts to protect or safeguard the integrity of such contract.
"The difficulty with the assumption of jurisdiction herein on the
theory that plaintiff's case arises under the Wagner Act is due to the
very apparent fact that the right that the plaintiff seeks to enforce is
not created, either expressly or impliedly, by the federal statute in ques-
tion, but by this proceeding he seeks to read into the act certain rights on
behalf of the employer to proceed in a court of equity which Congress
studiously refrained from giving to the employer. The courts cannot
create a right that Congress did not see fit to grant."
So far as the decisions go at the present time, then, federal courts do not have
jurisdiction of actions involving rights of employees (or employers) growing out
of or conferred upon such employees by the National Labor Relations Act, unless
some recognized ground of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship, is
present in the case. Such jurisdiction is centered exclusively in the National Labor
Relations Board.
JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS TO ENFORCE RIGHTS NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
What of the jurisdiction of state courts over private, as distinguished from
public, rights arising out of labor agreements resulting from the collective bargain-
ing process? As heretofore indicated,19 prior to the National Labor Relations Act
the courts recognized rights of employees arising under such contracts. Since the
passage of the Act an action by an individual on such a contract where the
question of the court's jurisdiction was raised has apparently not, as yet, been
presented to a state court.
That there is the theoretical, at least, possibility of maintaining such a suit is
indicated by the dicta in the National Licorice Co. and Newark Morning Ledger Co.
cases, supra. In the former the Court, in speaking of the board's order, related that
it "does not foreclose the employees from taking any action to secure an adjudi-
cation upon the contracts, nor prejudge their rights in the event of such adjudi-
cation." And, again, the board's order "is ineffective to determine any private
19. Hamilton, loc. cit. supra note 2.
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rights of the employees and leaves them free to assert such legal rights as they
may have acquired under their contracts, in any appropriate tribunal, . . ." In the-
latter case the Court stated, "We are thus not called upon to determine whether
Miss Fahy has an individual right to secure redress for her wrongful discharge
or whether the law of New Jersey affords her a forum for the appropriate redress.
of her grievance. The existence of such a private right in Miss Fahy in no way
affects the public right or the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to enforce it."
These expressions of dicta are not advanced as decisions and certainly give
no indication whatsoever that a state court, as such, would have jurisdiction of
an action of the kind under consideration.
It seems clear that no court, state or federal, has jurisdiction over an action
which would affect the right of employees to bargain collectively or any other
public right created or guaranteed under the National Labor Relations Act.
Despite the absence of decision on the question it would seem to be equally
clear that action by an employer or an employee on a labor agreement of the
nature under discussion which sought an adjudication of any question arising
therefrom which did not relate to the process of or right to collective bargaining
on the part of the employees or their right to. self organization or other public
right given them by the Act should be cognizable by a state court under its
common law jurisdiction of contracts generally.
That such a conclusion is warranted would seem to be indicated by decisions
that Congress, by enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, has not ex-
cluded the states from regulation in the field of labor relations provided such
state regulation does not conflict with that enacted by the federal act.
In Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,2
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, acting under the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Peace Act and on a complaint under that Act by the Allen-Bradley company,
found Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 and fourteen individual defendants (members
thereof) guilty of unfair labor practices under the Wisconsin act in certain actions
such as mass picketing to prevent work at the Allen-Bradley plant, threatening
employees desiring to work with bodily injury, obstructing entrance to and egress
from the plant, etc. The board made an order requiring the union, its officers,,
agents and members, from doing the things constituting unfair labor practices.
But the board made no determination, in the order, as to the fourteen individual
defendants. The acts of the defendants were committed during a strike at the
company's plant. The defendants contend the board's order is void as being re-
pugnant to the National Labor Relations Act. It was admitted that the company-
was subject to the National Labor Relations Act. But the federal board had not
undertaken in this case to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by the Nationar
Labor Relations Act. The court held, in an opinion narrowly based on the precise
facts and only on those provisions of the Wisconsin act involved in the state*
board proceeding, that there was no conflict of those provisions or of the state
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board's order with the National Labor Relations Act. It said:
"Congress has not made such employee and union conduct as is
involved in this case subject to regulation by the federal Board."
In discussing another case, the court said:
"Therefore we were more ready to conclude that a federal act in a
field that touched international relations superseded state regulation than
we were in those cases where a State was exercising its historic powers
over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the
use of streets and highways. Maurer v. Hamilton, supra, and cases cited.
Here we are dealing with the latter type of problem. We will not lightly
infer that Congress by the mere passage of a federal Act has impaired the
traditional sovereignty of the several States in that regard."
And the opinion further states:
"Nor can we say that the control which Congress has asserted over
the subject matter of labor disputes is so pervasive (Cf. Cloverleaf Butter
Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 62 S. Ct. 491, 86 L. Ed. -) as to
prevent Wisconsin under the familiar rule of Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 250 U.S. 566, 569, 40 S. Ct. 36, 37, 64 L. Ed.
1142, from supplementing federal regulation in the manner of this order.
Sec. 7 of the federal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157, guarantees labor its 'funda-
mental right' (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33, 57 S. Ct. 615, 622, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R
1352) to self-organiation and collective bargaining. Sec. 8 affords employees
protection against unfair labor practices of employers including em-
ployer interference with the rights secured by § 7. Sec. 9 affords machinery
for providing appropriate collective bargaining units. And § 10 grants the
federal Board 'exclusive' power of enforcement. It is not sufficient, how-
ever, to show that the state Act might be so construed and applied as
to dilute, impair, or defeat those rights. Watson v. Buck, supra .... If the
order of the state Board affected the status of the employees or if it
caused a forfeiture of collective bargaining rights, a distinctly different
question would arise. But since no such right is affected, we conclude that
this case is not basically different from the common situation where a
State takes steps to prevent breaches of the peace in connection with
labor disputes. Since the state system of regulation, as construed and
applied here, can be reconciled with the federal Act and since the two
as focused in this case can consistently stand together, the order of the
state Board must be sustained under the rule which has long obtained
in this Court. See Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243, 16 L. Ed. 243."
Davega City Radio, Inc. v. State Labor Relatios Board,21 was a proceeding
by the New York State Labor Relations Board charging the Davega company
with unfair labor practices. The employer (Davega) moved to vacate an order
of the board directing it to reinstate some employees and to take other action.
Davega contended that it was engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore, it
and its employees were subject to the National Labor Relations Act, but not the
State Labor Relations Act. The court related that "the State and National Acts
21. 281 N.Y. 13, 21, 22 N.E. (2d) 145, 147 (1939).
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are identical in aims and requirements, but the State Act adds requirements in
addition to, but in harmony with, those of the National Act" "The two statutes
are not only alike in their provisions but are almost identical in their language."
The court stated the question to be whether by reason of Article VI of the
Federal Constitution the mere existence of the National Labor Relations Act ousts
the state board from jurisdiction, it being assumed that Davega is within the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, and held the state board's order
to be valid. The court said:
"But where a State act is enforced in the absence of National legis-
lation, or a State act is enforced where there co-exists consistent National
legislation, then article VI is complied with since the supremacy of the
laws of the United States is in no manner impaired. 'Since there is
nothing in the State law which is inconsistent with, or could conceivably
interfere with the operation or enforcement of, the Federal law, the
statute of Missouri was not superseded.' Brandeis, J., Dickson v. Uhlmann
Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188, 200."
In United Baking Co. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, Local 221,22
it was held that the New York State Labor Relations Board which, as is seen
in Davega City Radio, Inc. v. State Labor Relations Board, sutpra, has powers
similar to the National Labor Relations Board, has no power to interpret, enforce
or abrogate any contract made by employer and trade union, particularly where it
is not a party to the contract.
VictoR A. WALLACE*
22., 257 App. Div. 501, 14 N.Y.S. (2) 74 (1939).
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